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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 13-3636 
______________ 
 
LARRY LEWIS; GREG BITTINGER, on behalf of themselves and others similarly 
situated; KARL BUDAY; GENE F. DAUM; RICHARD F. KUSHKOWSKI;  
JOHN CROCKER; KURT SZYMANSKI; ROBERT KLUGH, SR.,  
                                                                                                               Appellants 
v. 
 
ALLEGHENY LUDLUM CORPORATION;  
ALLEGHENY TECHNOLOGIES INCORPORATED 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 2-11-cv-01619) 
District Judge: Hon. Joy Flowers Conti 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 15, 2014 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, VANASKIE and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges
 
(Filed: August 27, 2014) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiffs, retired employees of Allegheny Ludlum Corporation (“Allegheny 
Ludlum”), appeal the dismissal of their putative class action against Allegheny Ludlum 
and Allegheny Technologies Incorporated (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging breach 
of contract under both the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) and the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (“ERISA”), and breach 
of fiduciary duty under ERISA.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
I. 
As we write principally for the benefit of the parties, we recite only the essential 
facts and procedural history.  Plaintiffs were members of the United Steelworkers union 
(“USW”).  USW had collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”) with Defendants.  The 
CBAs stated that the members’ insurance benefits were set forth in certain agreements, 
which were incorporated by reference into the CBAs.  The health insurance benefits for 
retirees were set forth in the Program of Hospital-Medical Benefits for Eligible 
Pensioners and Surviving Spouses (“PHMBs”).  Each PHMB from 1981 through the 
present contained the following “Continuation of Coverage” provision: 
Any pensioner or individual receiving a Surviving Spouse’s benefit who 
shall become covered by the Plan established by this Agreement shall not 
have such coverage terminated or reduced (except as provided in the Plan) 
so long as the individual remains retired from the Company or receives a 
Surviving Spouse’s benefit, notwithstanding the expiration of this 
Agreement, except as the Company and the Union may agree otherwise. 
 
App. 2151 (emphasis added); see also App. 1816-17, 1871, 1956, 2040, 2045-46, 2048-
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49.   
 Certain Plaintiffs opted for early retirement pursuant to the Transition Assistance 
Program (“TAP”).  The 2004 CBA, in which Defendants and USW agreed to the terms of 
the TAP, stated that TAP retirees were entitled to the health benefits offered “under the 
PHMB of the Allegheny Ludlum CBA.”  App. 1415.  Thus, all Plaintiffs are covered by 
the PHMBs.   
 Prior to 2008, retirees were not required to pay for certain types of coverage under 
the PHMBs, but on October 24, 2007, Defendants sent a letter to Plaintiffs and other plan 
participants announcing that they had agreed with USW that those “no cost” provisions 
would be replaced by coverage that required premium payments, effective January 1, 
2008.1        
On November 18, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint2 alleging that their “no cost” 
health benefits were vested, lifetime health benefits that could not be changed after 
retirement, and therefore the premiums charged violated the LMRA and ERISA.  
Plaintiffs also claim that Defendants breached their fiduciary duty under ERISA by 
representing to Plaintiffs, prior to their retirements, that their health benefits would be 
provided for life at no cost and by failing to inform them that these benefits could be 
                                                 
1 As of January 1, 2008, a $40 (individual) and $80 (family) per month premium 
was imposed upon pre-Medicare-eligible retirees, and a $20 (individual) and $40 (family) 
per month premium was imposed upon Medicare-eligible retirees.     
2 Plaintiffs originally filed their complaint in the Northern District of Ohio, but the 
case was transferred to the Western District of Pennsylvania. 
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changed by agreement with USW.     
After dismissals of the Complaint and Amended Complaint with leave to amend, 
the District Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Second Amended 
Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  
This appeal followed. 
II.3 
A. Breach of Contract 
 Plaintiffs argue that the CBAs vested them with “no cost” lifetime health benefits 
and did not grant Defendants the right to change these benefits.  ERISA treats the vesting 
of welfare plan benefits4 differently from pension benefits by not requiring welfare plan 
benefits for retirees to automatically vest because the costs of such plans can fluctuate 
due to, among other things, increased treatment costs.  U.A.W. v. Skinner Engine Co., 
188 F.3d 130, 138-39 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Smathers v. Multi-Tool, Inc./Multi-
                                                 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We exercise 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review of an order 
granting a motion to dismiss and apply the same standard as the District Court.  See 
Santomenno ex rel. John Hancock Trust v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 677 F.3d 178, 
182 (3d Cir. 2012).  When considering a motion to dismiss, we must determine whether 
the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  “A claim has facial plausibility 
when the plaintiff pleads factual content[, which is assumed to be true,] that allows the 
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged.”  Id. 
4 Welfare plans under ERISA are plans that provide “medical, surgical, or hospital 
care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or 
unemployment . . . .”  29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). 
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Plastics, Inc. Emp. Health & Welfare Plan, 298 F.3d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that 
a “presumption against vesting” exists in cases involving welfare benefit plans).  As a 
result, ERISA generally allows employers, “for any reason at any time, to adopt, modify, 
or terminate welfare plans.”  Skinner, 188 F.3d at 138 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  An employer’s commitment to vest retiree welfare benefits “is not to 
be inferred lightly” and “must be stated in clear and express language.”  Id. at 139.   
 Here, Plaintiffs have not identified any “clear and express language” in the 
PHMBs that confers unalterable, vested lifetime health benefits.  Id.  Indeed, the 
“Continuation of Coverage” provision explicitly reserves the right to change the health 
benefits for retirees through future agreement.  See App. 2151 (“except as the Company 
and the Union may agree otherwise”).  Plaintiffs attempt to create ambiguity in the 
“Continuation of Coverage” provision5 by pointing to the USW representative’s 
deposition, Plaintiffs’ own understanding, and references to the lifetime nature of the 
benefits elsewhere in Plan documents.  These efforts are unavailing because “the words 
of the contract clearly manifest the parties’ intent,” and therefore the “[C]ourt need not 
resort to extrinsic aids or evidence.”  Baldwin v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 636 F.3d 
                                                 
5 Plaintiffs also argue that the “Continuation of Coverage” provision in United 
Steelworks of America v. Cortland Container Corp., 105 B.R. 375, 376 (N.D. Ohio 
1989), is “virtually indistinguishable” from the provision here, and urge us to adopt that 
court’s conclusion, along with the conclusions of other cases addressing similar language.  
Appellant Br. 13-17.  Those cases rely on U.A.W. v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476 (6th 
Cir. 1983), in which the Sixth Circuit held that there is a presumption in favor of vesting 
for welfare benefits.  We expressly rejected Yard-Man in Skinner.  188 F.3d at 140-41. 
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69, 76 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).6  The plain language of the 
“Continuation of Coverage” provision makes clear that the USW and Allegheny Ludlum 
may agree to change the coverage provided under the PHMBs and, therefore, the 
provision is unambiguous.  Skinner, 188 F.3d at 142; cf. In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. 
Benefit ERISA Litig. (Unisys I), 58 F.3d 896, 903-04 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that an 
employer who “used terms such as ‘lifetime’ and ‘for life’ to describe the duration of 
retiree medical benefits, while at the same time expressly reserving the company’s right 
to terminate the plans under which those benefits were provided, did not render plans 
‘internally inconsistent’ and therefore ambiguous”).   
 Plaintiffs also argue that the “agree otherwise” language in the “Continuation of 
Coverage” provision should be read to apply only to then-active employees (i.e., future 
retirees) because USW should not be allowed to “sacrifice [r]etiree interests in favor of 
active employees who were the dues-paying Union members.”  Reply Br. 9 n.4.  Nothing 
in the CBAs or PHMBs suggests that USW’s authority is restricted to matters impacting 
active employees.  See Unisys I, 58 F.3d at 905 (rejecting plaintiffs’ contention that 
reservation of rights provision applied only to active employees and not to current 
retirees).   
                                                 
6 Further, because they are considered “subjective and self-serving extrinsic 
evidence,” “the testimonies of union members as to their understanding or belief of the 
duration of their retirement benefits cannot as a matter of law create an ambiguity.”  
Skinner, 188 F.3d at 146 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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 Plaintiffs’ claim that the “Continuation of Coverage” provision creates an illusory 
promise because Allegheny Ludlum “has unfettered freedom, [sic] to modify or terminate 
the healthcare benefits,” Appellant Br. 18, also fails.  “An illusory promise is one 
containing words ‘in promissory form that promise nothing’ and which ‘do not purport to 
put any limitation on the freedom of the alleged promisor.’”  Flores v. Am. Seafoods Co., 
335 F.3d 904, 912 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 2 Corbin on Contracts 142 (rev. ed. 1995)).  
Here, the promise was not illusory because it did not allow for modification solely by 
Allegheny Ludlum; instead, it allowed for modification only upon the agreement of both 
parties.  See App. 2151 (“except as the Company and the Union may agree otherwise”).  
Thus, Plaintiffs’ argument ignores the fact that USW is a party to the contract that must 
agree to any modification.  The fact that retirees are impacted by the changes to the 
agreement does not make it illusory. 
 TAP retirees fare no differently.  The clear language of the 2004 CBA that 
memorialized TAP explicitly states that TAP included “retiree health and life insurance 
under the PHMB of the Allegheny Ludlum CBA,” App. 1415, confirming that TAP did 
not create a new plan.  Thus, the TAP retirees are covered under the same PHMBs as 
non-TAP retirees, and are subject to the same “Continuation of Coverage” provision.  
The fact that TAP retirees were required to sign a General Waiver and Release 
Agreement (“Release Agreement”) to participate in TAP does not change their health 
benefits.  Even though the Release Agreement contained an integration clause and does 
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not describe retiree health benefits or refer to the PHMBs by name, it specifically 
incorporates by reference an “informational packet” that identifies the actual benefits 
being provided, including “medical coverage under a Company-sponsored medical plan 
for Eligible Retirees and Surviving Spouses,” App. 2466, which is a reference to the 
PHMBs.  
 In sum, Plaintiffs have not identified any “clear and express language” that vests 
their health benefits, and therefore their breach of contract claims were appropriately 
dismissed. 
B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
 Defendants challenge the timeliness of Plaintiffs’ fiduciary duty claim.  ERISA 
prohibits filing suit for fiduciary duty violations more than six years after “the date of the 
last action which constituted a part of the breach or violation,” or more than three years 
after the plaintiff had “actual knowledge of the breach or violation,” whichever is earlier.7  
29 U.S.C. § 1113; see also Montrose Med. Grp. Participating Sav. Plan v. Bulger, 243 
F.3d 773, 787 (3d Cir. 2001).   
 We have held that “‘actual knowledge of a breach or violation’ requires that a 
plaintiff have actual knowledge of all material facts necessary to understand that some 
                                                 
7 In addition to finding that the three year statute of limitations barred Plaintiffs’ 
claims, the District Court found that at least some Plaintiffs were also barred from 
bringing a fiduciary claim under the six year statute of limitations.  Because we hold that 
all Plaintiffs received “actual knowledge” on January 1, 2008 and thus are barred from 
suit by the three year statute of limitations ending January 1, 2011, we need not address 
whether the six year statute of limitations applies.  
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claim exists, which facts could include . . . knowledge of a transaction’s harmful 
consequences, or even actual harm.”   Gluck v. Unisys Corp., 960 F.2d 1168, 1177 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted).  To satisfy this requirement, Defendants must 
show Plaintiffs actually knew: (1) about “the events that occurred which constitute the 
breach or violation,” and (2) that “those events supported a claim of breach of fiduciary 
duty or violation under ERISA.”  Int’l Union of Elec. Workers v. Murata Erie N. Am., 
Inc., 980 F.2d 889, 900 (3d Cir. 1992).  The second prong can be satisfied by “actual 
knowledge of harm or harmful consequences.”  Richard B. Roush, Inc. Profit Sharing 
Plan v. New Engl. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 311 F.3d 581, 587 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 Here, Plaintiffs had actual knowledge of the purported breach of fiduciary duty no 
later than January 1, 2008, when they began paying increased premiums despite 
Allegheny Ludlum’s alleged misrepresentations that they would not have to do so.  
Plaintiffs received notice of the event that constituted the alleged breach through the 
October 24, 2007 letter that stated that they would owe these premiums.  Moreover, the 
payment obligations that went into effect on January 1, 2008 were “harm or harmful 
consequences” of the type sufficient to satisfy the actual knowledge requirement.  See 
Cetel v. Kirwan Fin. Grp., Inc., 460 F.3d 494, 511-12 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding plaintiffs 
gained “actual knowledge” when they learned they faced financial penalties in “direct 
contradiction” to what they had been told by fiduciary); Kurtz v. Phila. Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 
1544, 1551 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding plaintiffs gained “actual knowledge” when they 
 10 
 
learned of “harmful consequences” of fiduciary’s actions through monetary cost to them).  
Thus, because they had knowledge of the harm no later than January 1, 2008, the three 
year statute of limitations expired on January 1, 2011.  As a result, the fiduciary duty 
claim asserted in the November 18, 2011 Complaint is time-barred. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting the 
motion to dismiss. 
